Why Efforts To Centralize The Us Intelligence Community Fail

Download or read book Why Efforts to Centralize the U. S. Intelligence Community Fail written by School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and published by Createspace Independent Pub. This book was released on 2014-10-09 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II, THE FORMAL COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES FELL ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THE DOMAIN OF THE MILITARY. THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR AND OTHER EVENTS DURING THAT WAR CREATED A GROWING CONSENSUS THAT THE NATION REQUIRED A CENTRAL AUTHORITY TO MANAGE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PERTINENT TO MULTIPLE DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN RESPONSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 CREATED THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. OVER THE NEXT HALF-CENTURY, NUMEROUS COMMISSIONS AND PANELS FOUND NEITHER THE AGENCY NOR THE DIRECTOR EVER WIELDED EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THE DIVERSE AND GROWING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN RESPONSE TO SUCH FINDINGS, PRESIDENTS ISSUED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVES AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND CONGRESS SIGNED MULTIPLE BILLS TO REINFORCE THE CIA AND DCI'S AUTHORITY OVER THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, BUT THE PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION PERSIST. THE TERRORIST ATTACK OF 9/11 PROVIDED SUFFICIENT IMPETUS TO MAKE THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO THE FAILED US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SINCE 1947. TO EVALUATE THE PROSPECTS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004 TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CENTRAL CONTROL OVER THE COMMUNITY IT IS HELPFUL TO IDENTIFY THE FACTORS THAT FRUSTRATED PREVIOUS REFORM EFFORTS. FIVE SUCH FACTORS ARE IDENTIFIED HERE: THE MOTIVE AND ABILITY OF EXISTING INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS TO RESIST CENTRALIZED CONTROL; THE ASSOCIATION OF CENTRAL DIRECTORS WITH COVERT OPERATIONS; THE TENDENCY TO TIE A CENTRAL DIRECTOR'S AUTHORITY TO HIS/HER ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT; THE PROLIFERATION OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES; AND THE INCREASING CO-OPTION OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. WHILE THE 2004 ACT SOMEWHAT MITIGATES THE SECOND FACTOR'S CONFOUNDING INFLUENCE, THE OTHER FACTORS ARE LIKELY TO PLAGUE THE NEW NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR'S EFFORTS TO EFFECTIVELY LEAD THE COMMUNITY. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S PROCLIVITY TO RESIST CONTROL WHILE CO-OPTING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS IS ESPECIALLY LIKELY TO FRUSTRATE THE NEW AUTHORITY TO THE DETRIMENT OF OVERALL NATIONAL SECURITY.