Game Theory Diplomatic History And Security Studies

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Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies

Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies
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ISBN-10 : 019186952X
ISBN-13 : 9780191869525
Rating : 4/5 (525 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies by : Frank C. Zagare

Download or read book Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies written by Frank C. Zagare and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The main purpose of this book is to demonstrate, by way of example, the several advantages of using a formal game-theoretic framework to explain complex events, diplomatic history, and contentious interstate relationships, via causal mechanisms and rationality. Chapter 1 lays out the broad parameters and major concepts of the mathematical theory of games and its applications in the security studies literature. Chapter 2 explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives, both generally and specifically. Chapter 3 interprets the Moroccan crisis of 1905-6 in the context of an incomplete information game model. Chapter 4 surveys and evaluates several prominent attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Chapter 5 offers a general explanation that answers all of the foundational questions associated with the Cuban crisis within the confines of a single, integrated, game-theoretic model with incomplete information. Chapter 6 uses the same game form to develop a logically consistent and empirically plausible explanation of the outbreak of war in Europe in early August 1914. Chapter 7 introduces perfect deterrence theory and contrasts it with the prevailing realist theory of interstate war prevention, and classical deterrence theory. Chapter 8 addresses the charge made by some behavioral economists (and many strategic analysts) that game theory is of limited utility for understanding interstate conflict behavior.


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