An Electoral Theory of Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules
| Author | : Jon X. Eguia |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2014 |
| ISBN-10 | : OCLC:1376289242 |
| ISBN-13 | : |
| Rating | : 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Download or read book An Electoral Theory of Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules written by Jon X. Eguia and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously, and whose members face an election after each legislative term. An agenda protocol or bargaining rule assigns to each legislator a probability of being recognized to make a policy proposal in the assembly. We predict that the agenda protocol chosen in equilibrium disproportionately favors more senior legislators, granting them greater opportunities to make policy proposals, and it generates an incumbency advantage to all legislators.
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